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The Political Economy of Facebook Advertising:
Election Spending, Regulation and Targeting
Online
KATHARINE DOMMETT AND SAM POWER
Abstract
Political advertising on Facebook is the latest in a long line of developments in campaign
practice, and is a tool that has been mobilised extensively in elections around the world. In
this article, we explore what we know about Facebook advertising at elections and ask what
existing data from the UK Electoral Commission can reveal about current usage. Highlight-
ing the principles behind Facebook advertising, we argue that existing metrics offer little
insight into current campaign trends—posing analytical, methodological and normative chal-
lenges for academics and electoral regulators alike. Moreover, we argue that these challenges
strike at the heart of debates about democratic responsibility and the degree to which
governments should cede responsibility to commercial actors who may have differing
understandings of fundamental democratic norms.
Keywords: Facebook, election spending, targeting, regulation, political ﬁnancing
Introduction
OVER RECENT years, Facebook has gained
increased attention for its role in elections. Most
prominent in the US, but also evident in coun-
tries ranging from the UK to Ukraine, Brazil
and Australia, Facebook has begun to be used
in a range of different ways. In this article, we
examine the rise of Facebook advertising and,
in particular, the use of micro-targeted adverts
that are used to provide segmented messages to
different groups online. We look at the impli-
cations of Facebook adverts for our under-
standing of election spending and regulation.
Unpicking available data from the UK, we
show that we can gain only limited insight into
advertising practices on Facebook based on cur-
rent spending declaration requirements. But,
even if there was greater transparency, the eco-
nomic logics that govern Facebook advertising
would make it challenging to apply conven-
tional metrics of campaign spending to interpret
the signiﬁcance of any ﬁgures declared.
The rise of Facebook advertising
Facebook has rapidly cultivated a signiﬁcant
role in elections. Whilst just a few years ago,
scholars were only starting to note the cre-
ation of Facebook pages and proﬁles by elec-
tion candidates, now Facebook is an
accepted part of election campaigns in many
countries. In particular, much recent atten-
tion has been paid to the use of Facebook for
political advertising and micro-targeting.
Recent headlines have seen the New York
Times announce: ‘It’s ofﬁcial: President
Trump is the single biggest political adver-
tiser on Facebook’, whilst in the UK The
Guardian proclaimed, ‘UK parties spend big
on Facebook’.
With Facebook reporting 2.27 billion
monthly active users as of 30 September
2018, the potential audience available to par-
ties and candidates is huge. Facebook offers
a new platform on which to transmit cam-
paign messages, but it also offers data, col-
lected from users, that can be purchased to
enable targeted advertising. Whilst not
allowing clients to extract lists of users iden-
tiﬁed by name and by traits, campaigners
can use ﬁlters based on keywords or cate-
gories including geographical data, and algo-
rithmically created lifestyle proﬁles. It is
therefore possible to identify Facebook users
in speciﬁc areas, with speciﬁc interests,
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dispositions and demographic traits who can
be sent bespoke adverts that mirror their ideas
—a strategy seen to be deployed successfully
by the Conservatives in 2015.1 Whilst targeted
messaging and personalised political commu-
nication is not new, these new forms of data
and the speed at which adverts can be placed
online signal an important development in
election campaigns.
For the uninitiated, Facebook advertising
works as follows. Adverts can only be cre-
ated by ‘pages’. These pages tend not to be
personal—like user ‘proﬁles’—but are rather
a speciﬁc classiﬁcation of content created by
businesses, brands, celebrities or campaigns
to promote their activities and goals. Having
created an advertising account, actors can
select their advertising objective, audience,
budget and format. It is also possible to run
A/B testing on adverts, and to gather a
range of metrics to determine the success of
different strategies. The ease of Facebook’s
advertising interface has made it possible for
a range of individuals to commission
adverts, ranging from high-budget, national
adverts, to small budget, localised initiatives.
Reﬂecting rising awareness of Facebook
advertising, signiﬁcant coverage has been
given to the amount being spent by election
campaigns on Facebook. It has been reported
that at the US midterm elections ‘Digital
media campaign spending rose 2,400 per
cent from the 2014 midterms to $1.8 billion,
roughly 20 percent of the total $8.9 billion in
ad spending’.2 Similarly, in the UK, large
amounts of coverage has been given to the
Electoral Commission’s announcement that
£3.2 million was spent by parties at the 2017
general election. Whilst useful for tracing the
increased resources devoted to digital, and
speciﬁcally for noting the increased signiﬁ-
cance of platforms such as Facebook, we
argue that there are important limitations in
this data that have implications for our
understanding of election campaigns. To
advance this argument, we discuss data from
the UK Electoral Commission in detail, using
ofﬁcial ﬁgures to highlight the limitations of
available data. This approach extends exist-
ing studies that have traced parties’
increased reliance on social media in election
campaigns.3 By speciﬁcally interrogating ofﬁ-
cial statistics we build on Martin Moore’s
contention that ‘the failure of existing
electoral legislation and guidelines to take
digital media—and particularly social media
—into account jeopardises the fairness and
openness of UK elections’, showing precisely
where and how current regulations allow
questions to arise.4
Election spend reporting in the
UK: the ofﬁcial story
The data available to pick apart trends in
Facebook advertising is patchy. On the one
hand, analysts can draw on ﬁgures released
by campaigns themselves, whilst on the
other they can use ofﬁcial electoral reporting
ﬁgures. Whilst neither source is ideal, the
ofﬁcial story presented by electoral returns
made to the Electoral Commission often
gains widespread attention and has provided
an important metric against which cam-
paigns are understood.
The UK has a long history of electoral
oversight and detailed returns are made on a
range of aspects of election spending, to the
extent that the Electoral Commission data-
base is viewed by cross-country experts as
‘effectively world leading at this point’.5 To
provide some context to our discussion of
Facebook spending data, the Commission
requires campaigns to declare on overall
spending (Figure 1), revealing these elections
to be considerably less expensive than the
US. In a study of twenty-ﬁve democracies,
Karl-Heinz Nassmacher deﬁnes the UK as
having a comparatively moderate level of
party expense—with moderate being the most
modest levels of spending, excessive being
the biggest spenders and intermediate being
somewhere in between.6 This places the UK,
alongside states such as Australia, the
Netherlands and Denmark. The USA is
described as having a comparatively interme-
diate level of spending, alongside countries
such as Canada, France, Germany, Spain
and Sweden.
Beyond these headline ﬁgures, the Com-
mission also requires parties to breakdown
their spending to detail the kinds of
things political parties spend money on.
Ten categories are used: unsolicited mate-
rial to electors, advertising, market
research/canvassing, overheads and general
administration, rallies and other events,
2 KA T H A R I N E D OMM E T T A N D S AM P OW E R
The Political Quarterly © 2019 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC).
manifesto or referendum material, trans-
port, campaign broadcasts, media and bal-
ancing items.7 Of the total spending,
unsolicited material to electors, advertising
and market research/canvassing tend to
dominate spending activities (Figure 2).
These categories describe actions such as
the production of election leaﬂets, bill-
boards, the purchasing of ‘wraparound’
adverts in regional newspapers and the use
of call centres for phone-banking exercises.
These reporting requirements have typically
made it hard for observers to gauge the degree
of party spending on digital campaigns
because there is no requirement to differentiate
between digital and non-digital spending. The
Electoral Commission—and others such as the
Council of Europe—recognise this point, lead-
ing them to argue in a recent report that the
spending categories should be revised:
There is no speciﬁc legal category for digital
campaigning. We can see from our records
that different campaigners have declared it
under different spending categories, but
mostly as advertising. We recommended after
the 2015 UK parliament general election that
the spending categories should be revised to
provide more useful information about what
campaigners have spent money on . . .[this]
would be a valuable additional tool to track
and check the spending on digital campaign-
ing. We think it would be too simplistic to add
a new ‘digital’ category . . . instead it would be
better to create sub-categories to record what
medium or format was used for the activity.8
The lack of digital spending requirement
means that it is challenging to discern how
much money is being spent on Facebook,
and speciﬁcally on Facebook advertising.
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some
inferences about Facebook spending by look-
ing both at data provided by the Com-
mission on digital as a proportion of
advertising, and by searching the speciﬁc
providers that campaigns purchase services
from. Exploring these two sources of data
we highlight two challenges: ﬁrst, concerning
limitations in what this data shows, and
Figure 1: Declared UK election spending totals for all parties, 2001–2017
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second, relating to important features of
Facebook advertising spending that can
easily go unrecognised when interpreting
these ﬁgures.
Election spending on Facebook
For those interested in Facebook advertising,
the Electoral Commission’s recent report,
Digital Campaigning: Increasing Transparency
for Voters, provides important new insight.
Presenting data on digital advertising spend,
the Commission offered data on the amount
of money being deployed on digital advertis-
ing platforms such as Facebook, Google and
Twitter. We can use this data to estimate
how much advertising spend is being spent
on digital. The ofﬁcial returns show us that
in 2017 42.8 per cent of reported spending
on advertising was digital (an increase from
32.3 per cent in 2016).9
Combining this data, we can put an esti-
mated ﬁgure, not just on the percentage, but
on the actual amount parties spent on digital
advertising. Presented in Figure 3, this data
shows a stark rise in digital advertising as a
total of overall advertising spend—from 1.7
per cent in 2014 (about £30,000 in the Scot-
tish independence referendum) to 42.8 per
cent in 2017 (about £4.3 million of the adver-
tising returns). Total spending was also con-
siderably higher. In 2014, just under £1.9
million was declared as spent on advertising,
whilst in 2017 just over £10 million
was declared.10
These ﬁndings suggest that parties are
devoting considerable resources to digital
advertising, but it is not yet clear which
speciﬁc outlets are receiving these funds. A
second source of data is insightful here, as it
is possible to search Commission data to
identify speciﬁc service providers in a cam-
paign. Conducting a keyword search of
Facebook, it appears that just over £3.2 mil-
lion was spent on this platform across all
spending categories (see Table 1). Of speciﬁc
interest to this paper, just over £3.16 million
was spent on Facebook advertising by all
UK parties at the 2017 general election (com-
pared with just over £1 million on Google,
£54,000 on Twitter, just under £25,000 on
Amazon and just £239,000 on ‘traditional’
advertising in national and regional
media outlets).
On the basis of this data, it appears that
Facebook advertising is indeed becoming a
feature of election campaigns in the UK.
However, we argue that there are two
important issues. First, there are signiﬁcant
limitations in available data that make it dif-
ﬁcult to interrogate how extensively Face-
book advertising is being used. And second,
that even if more detailed information was
available, these returns cannot be interpreted
Figure 2: Declared UK election spending totals, 2001–2017 showing classiﬁcation of
spending
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as akin to spending returns on leaﬂets and
billboards. Instead, we argue that to grasp
the signiﬁcance of any ﬁgures declared, ana-
lysts need to understand the distinctive prin-
ciples governing Facebook advertising that
affect how this data can be interpreted.
What these ﬁgures obscure
First, looking at available data, there are
clear limitations to the information currently
in the public realm. As the Electoral
Commission itself acknowledges, the data on
digital advertising percentages ‘does not
show the full picture of digital advertising at
elections and referendums’, as it only con-
tains ‘spending data for the most well-
known platforms’.11 Yet, even for prominent
platforms such as Facebook there are limita-
tions. Whilst a considerable percentage of
spend appears to be devoted to Facebook
advertising, it is not evident what form this
advertising takes. Although the Electoral
Commission does not itself focus on the con-
tent of advertising campaigns, there is
important contextual information about the
type of adverts being placed that is not
being gathered. For example, as has widely
been discussed, Facebook advertising can be
used to conduct micro-targeting and to focus
on highly specialised audiences. However, at
present, it is not clear from ofﬁcial available
data what kind of adverts parties are fund-
ing and how extensive their reach is.
This kind of data is held by Facebook
itself, along with a range of metrics around
advert impression. Accounts have emerged
claiming a high degree of targeting. For
example, Goodman et al.’s account of the
2017 general election reported that ‘[u]sing
Facebook’s targeting tools, the [Conserva-
tive] party was able to reach 80.65% of Face-
book users in the key marginal seats. The
party’s videos were viewed 3.5 million times,
while 86.9% of all ads served had social con-
text—the all-important endorsement by a
friend’.12 Whilst targeting information is
therefore available, this is not reﬂected in
ofﬁcial reporting requirements, meaning it is
impossible to determine from Electoral
Figure 3: Advertising spend on digital, 2014–2017
Table 1: Reported spending on Facebook
across spending categories
Category of expenditure Reported spend on
Facebook
Advertising £3,166,263.63
Manifesto or referendum
material
£36,870.78
Market research/canvass-
ing
£42,312.03
Rallies and other events £2,320.37
Media £14,800.67
Overheads and general
administration
£362.30
Unsolicited material to
electors
£120.00
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Commission data what type of adverts were
placed at an election, and how extensively
targeted these were. It is also not clear how
the audience was determined, and whether
campaigners are exclusively relying on Face-
book data to deﬁne their audiences, or
whether internal party databases are being
drawn upon to identify audiences. This
means that we have limited understanding
of the way in which Facebook advertising
practices are being mobilised by cam-
paigns. Given that campaign actors are often
incentivised to inﬂate the sophistication of
their campaigns, the ability to verify these
accounts is a cause for concern.
Second, as acknowledged by the Electoral
Commission, a key challenge of monitoring
digital spending is that it can be classiﬁed
under many headings. Although it is possi-
ble to examine declared advertising spending
that explicitly mentions Facebook to gain an
impression of the use of this tool, it is impor-
tant to recognise that Facebook advertising
costs could potentially be reported under a
different heading. Take, for example, market
research/canvassing. One of the key capabil-
ities of Facebook advertising is the ability to
test different messages on audiences to
gather new political intelligence about the
effectiveness of interventions. Such practices
could qualify as market research, causing
these expenses to be declared under this
heading (and not advertising). At present it
is not currently clear what percentage of
Facebook spending, if any, is being classiﬁed
in this way. Whilst the Electoral Commission
is currently consulting on new guidelines for
declaring digital spending, there are ambigu-
ities that could mask different types of Face-
book advertising spend.
Third, although keyword searching ser-
vice providers offers a useful way of identi-
fying the distribution of party spending to
different platforms, this method only picks
up on instances in which there is a direct
relationship between parties and digital ser-
vice providers. However, there are a range
of digital intermediaries that have emerged
in the electoral marketplace. Political con-
sultants, data analysis or data collection
companies are regularly working with polit-
ical parties to curate political adverts on
platforms. Importantly for those interested
in spending on platforms such as Facebook,
these intermediary actors can place adverts
on behalf of parties. It is therefore possible
for a consultancy—such as the Messina
Group in the UK—to place adverts on
Facebook utilising their allocated funds.
Such activities may not be recorded as
advertising but could also appear under the
heading market research/canvassing. The
potential for such practices means that, at
present, it is not possible to use these kinds
of searches to capture the full extent of par-
ties’ use of Facebook advertising.
Fourth, these ﬁgures only capture ofﬁcial
spend by UK political parties. Although UK
electoral rules do not allow for the kind of
Political Action Committees (PACs) found
in the US, it is possible for external cam-
paigners and ‘satellite campaigns’13 to com-
mission and run political adverts. It would
therefore be possible, for example, for
Momentum—a grassroots organisation afﬁli-
ated with Labour—to place political adverts
supporting the Labour Party that Labour
itself would not have to declare in their
returns. Whilst there are requirements for
external campaigns that plan to spend more
than £20,000 in England or £10,000 in any
of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland on
campaign activity during a regulated period
to register with the Commission, much dig-
ital campaigning can be done without
exceeding this threshold. This makes it hard
to trace how many external actors are plac-
ing political adverts, or to gain a sense of
how much revenue is being spent by non-
afﬁliated satellite campaigns. Furthermore,
although steps have been taken by Face-
book to provide more transparency about
political adverts, it is often challenging to
determine the origin of political adverts.
This is because, whilst advertisers are
required to say which page paid for the
advert, they can provide little detail about
their identity as long as it’s not deceptive
or misleading.14 This means that an advert
can be made by ‘People for Common
Sense’ promoting Conservative messages,
without additional detail about who is
funding that advert—or whether their
spending has been declared. These gaps in
regulation make it difﬁcult to determine not
only what parties are doing, but what cam-
paigns supportive of parties are spending
on Facebook advertising.
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These points suggest that there are signiﬁ-
cant gaps in our understanding of the use of
Facebook advertising for political campaigns.
Given that the UK is seen to lead the way in
spending declarations, these trends suggest
that in many other jurisdictions, our under-
standing is likely to be far worse.
Even if we did have good ﬁgures,
why would we need to approach
them with caution?
The above discussion suggests that there are
important gaps in reported ﬁgures that make
it hard to discern the spending devoted by
campaigns to Facebook advertising. How-
ever, even if there was complete information,
we argue that there are distinctive aspects of
Facebook spending that mean this data
needs to be viewed and interpreted in a dif-
ferent way to conventional election spend-
ing. This point is important, as spending
returns have historically provided a means
of evaluating the relative investments of
campaigns, allowing scholars to examine the
degree of resource inequality, and the scale
and scope of political campaigns.
The need for further analysis relates to the
marketplace logics that govern spending on
Facebook. Historically, spending returns
have provided a useful metric by which to
evaluate the relative spending of campaigns,
as the items being reported had relatively
constant spending requirements. In this way,
because leaﬂets roughly cost the same
amount (with only minor variations in price
dependent on quality and number), it was
possible to infer how much material cam-
paigns produced and therefore how exten-
sive their campaign was. When looking at
Facebook data, however, it is not possible to
draw the same conclusions as the amount
spent does not necessarily equal a greater
volume of adverts placed.
Facebook effectively uses a ‘pay to play’
model of targeted advertising which is
underpinned by an ‘auctioning’ model. This
means that a hypothetical £100 spent by the
Conservative Party and £100 spent by the
Labour Party will not necessarily purchase
the same number of adverts. The price of
an advert varies in accordance with the
audience an advertiser wants to reach, but
also the marketplace in which that adver-
tiser is working. Hence, adverts in a mar-
ginal constituency will be more expensive,
as will adverts that are directed at an audi-
ence that is in high demand from advertis-
ers (such as young men).
In addition, Nadler et al. highlight how
cost can also be affected by the content (and
reception) of campaign material.15 These
authors discuss how the Facebook advertis-
ing system comprises a ‘complex model that
considers both the dollar value of each bid
as well as how good a piece of clickbait (or
view-bait, or comment-bait) the correspond-
ing ad is. If Facebook’s model thinks your
ad is ten times more likely to engage a user
than a company’s ad, then your effective bid
at auction is considered ten times higher
than a company willing to pay the same dol-
lar amount’. This reveals that content which
is more engaging is prioritised (and hence is
less expensive) for campaigns.
Furthermore, there is another variable that
relates to the relationship between adverts
and ‘organic’ content. In addition to adverts,
Facebook can be used by campaigners to
share content without spending funds.
Known as ‘organic sharing’ this term cap-
tures instances in which campaigners ‘spread
their messages for free by encouraging their
supporters to share them with their friends
and family’.16 Whilst not all organic sharing
is ‘viral’, campaigns can disseminate their
materials through these means—as evident
in the 2017 Labour Party campaign and 2016
Trump campaign. Although organic dissemi-
nation is discrete from paid content, there is
often a relationship between the two types
of sharing on Facebook. Indeed, whilst a
campaign can often start out as paid, over
time it can be shared organically, whilst—
vice versa—a successful organic cam-
paign may be actively promoted through
paid advertising.
At present, the distinction between paid
and organic posts is illustrated on Facebook
by the use of the label ‘sponsored’. This
appears alongside adverts and is often com-
bined with data from a Facebook users’ pro-
ﬁle to highlight which of the users’ friends
‘like’ or have interacted with the source in
the past. If, however, a user shares paid for
content on their own Facebook feed, then it
is counted as organic and no longer appears
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as paid for content. This means that the
‘boundary between ads and other types
of posts can be porous’,17 making it hard
to easily classify what has and has not
been ofﬁcially produced by a campaign,
and what has been organically shared or
deliberately targeted.
These ambiguities mean that even if
greater detail on advertising spending was
provided to the Electoral Commission, it
would remain difﬁcult for observers to
determine the extent of campaigning mate-
rial on Facebook and the degree to which
paid advertising intersects with organic
reach. Determining the scope of Facebook
campaigning is therefore not possible
by just studying declared advertising
spending alone.
Conclusion
Much attention has been given to the rise of
Facebook advertising in elections. However,
exploring trends in the UK, we have shown
that we actually possess a very limited
understanding of how this tool is being
used. Moreover, the data we do possess can
create misleading impressions if discussed
without reference to important aspects of
Facebook’s advertising architecture. Cam-
paigning on Facebook using paid for adver-
tising is, therefore, not the same as
producing election leaﬂets or campaigning
on TV; there are important particularities
that need to be acknowledged if campaign-
ing spending is to be effectively interpreted
and understood.
More broadly, our article has shown the
growing challenge that regulators and those
interested in digital campaigning face. Whilst
campaign ﬁnance and spending was once a
key way of tracing campaign activity and
monitoring current practices, developments
online make it increasingly difﬁcult for this
metric to capture what is going on. With
new capacities to share content with mini-
mal, if any, campaign spending and signiﬁ-
cant variations in the cost and reach of
different types of Facebook content, it is
hard to determine what campaigns have
purchased, and how comparable campaign-
ing activities are. Moreover, with the rise of
satellite campaigns and actors not required
to declare spending online under a certain
threshold, it is hard to determine what is
happening online, let alone whether these
practices violate democratic norms.
These developments do not, however, just
represent a methodological and analytical
challenge, they also raise more fundamental
questions about the normative assumptions
behind centuries of legislation. Current levels
of candidate (local) spending are based on
historic notions of what it is considered rea-
sonable to spend on each elector, per con-
stituency.18 National spending limits were,
for example, set out in the 2000 Political Par-
ties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA)
before online advertising came to promi-
nence, whilst candidate (local) spending was
ﬁrst introduced in 1883 as a part of the Cor-
rupt and Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act
(CIPPA). Indeed, the aspects of PPERA
related to campaign spending were set, in
part, on the basis that CIPPA had worked
(relatively) well at the local level. Given
that Facebook, and indeed other online
advertising platforms, are redeﬁning our
understanding of what it costs to reach vot-
ers—and legislation in this area has been
shown to have a certain historic and norma-
tive path dependence—questions emerge
about the extent to which existing regulatory
frameworks remain relevant and need to
be revised.
For this reason, there is a need to re-visit
debates around election regulation to ask
whether campaign spending rules are ﬁt for
purpose, or whether they require revision to
match digital campaigning trends. Even with
the most robust set of spending require-
ments, regulators such as the Electoral Com-
mission would not be placed to address
questions relating to the content and target-
ing of online advertising and campaigns. For
this reason, we argue that there are impor-
tant new questions that concern who—if
anyone—should be responsible for oversee-
ing the conduct of modern campaigns,
whether conducted using Facebook advertis-
ing, or alternative platforms and tools.
Looking beyond the UK, we argue that
this case offers important lessons for coun-
tries elsewhere. Given the UK’s status as a
leading regulator of political campaigns, we
can expect to have far less understanding of
digital campaigning practices in other coun-
tries around the world. In the US, for
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example, where far greater sums of money
are spent on advertising on Facebook (and
where regulation remains relatively lax) it is
harder to verify how these tools are being
used. In thinking about a response, it is
therefore interesting to consider whether
national regulators should act or whether
platforms themselves, who operate in multi-
ple jurisdictions, should be leading the way
on transparency. This question goes to the
heart of debates about democratic responsi-
bility and the degree to which governments
are happy to cede responsibility (and even
sovereignty) to commercial actors who may
not uphold democratic norms.
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